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Abstract
Background: Limited information is available about pandemic H1N1-2009 influenza vaccine effectiveness in tropical
communities. We studied the effectiveness of a pandemic H1N1 vaccination program in reducing influenza cases in
Singapore.
Methods: A surveillance study was conducted among military personnel presenting with febrile respiratory illness from mid-
2009 to mid-2010. Consenting individuals underwent nasal washes, which were tested with RT-PCR and subtyped. A
vaccination program (inactivated monovalent Panvax H1N1-2009 vaccine) was carried out among recruits. A Bayesian
hierarchical model was used to quantify relative risks in the pre- and post-vaccination periods. An autoregressive
generalised linear model (GLM) was developed to minimise confounding.
Results: Of 2858 participants, 437(15.3%), 60(2.1%), and 273(9.6%) had pandemic H1N1, H3N2, and influenza B. The ratio of
relative risks for pandemic H1N1 infection before and after vaccination for the recruit camp relative to other camps was
0.14(0.016,0.49); for H3N2, 0.44(0.035,1.8); and for influenza B, 18(0.77,89). Using the GLM for the recruit camp, post-
vaccination weekly cases decreased by 54%(37%,67%, p,0.001) from that expected without vaccination; influenza B
increased by 66 times(9–479 times, p,0.001); with no statistical difference for H3N2 (p=0.54).
Conclusions: Pandemic vaccination reduced H1N1-2009 disease burden among military recruits. Routine seasonal influenza
vaccination should be considered.
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Introduction
Tropical regions experience influenza all year round, usually
with two annual epidemic peaks [1] and an impact comparable to
temperate regions [2]. In tropical Singapore, seasonal influenza
mortality rates have been shown to be similar to temperate and
sub-tropical countries [3], and excess deaths in Singapore from
previous pandemics were comparable with global estimates [4].
The 2009 influenza pandemic also affected Singapore, infecting
13% of community-living adults during the first epidemic wave
[5]. In spite of the clear burden of influenza, seasonal influenza
vaccination rates are low for a variety of reasons [3,5,6].
Within the national population, closed and semi-closed com-
munities such as schools and militaries have a higher incidence of
respiratory infections which can spread to the general population,
and are at risk of outbreaks of respiratory infections such as
influenza [7–10]. However, there have been few influenza sur-
veillance studies showing the effectiveness of influenza vaccines in
tropical regions, especially with the 2009 pandemic vaccine in
closed and semi-closed communities.
We therefore performed a prospective surveillance study in the
Singapore military to determine the incidence of different
influenza strains circulating in the military using molecular
methods, and evaluate the effectiveness of a targeted pandemic
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confirmed influenza of different subtypes.
Methods
The Singapore military started a respiratory disease surveillance
program in four sentinel camps on 11 May 2009, before the
community spread of H1N1 pandemic influenza in late June 2009
[11]. These included one major recruit training camp (camp A), as
recruits are especially affected by influenza outbreaks [9,12–14].
All medically fit males in Singapore are conscripted for two years
after high school; the servicemen in the recruit camp and other
camps were mostly young adults out of high school. These
servicemen across all camps live in the camps during weekdays
and return home on weekends, maintaining substantial interaction
with the general population. All personnel who visited the camps’
primary healthcare clinics during the usual consultation hours with
febrile respiratory illness (FRI), which we defined as fever$37.5uC
with cough and/or sore throat, were invited to participate. As we
intended to capture additional febrile cases that potentially
resulted in absenteeism, while excluding milder non-febrile cases,
this is slightly different from the usual use of ‘‘influenza-like illness’’
(ILI, fever.38.0uC with cough and/or sore throat). We excluded
repeat visits for the same illness episode.
As nasal washes are equally or more sensitive than nasal or
throat swabs, and nasopharyngeal aspirates, in detecting influenza
[15–17], trained healthcare staff obtained nasal washes (from both
sides of the nose) from consenting participants. The washes were
placed in viral transport media (Copan Diagnostics Inc., Corona,
CA, USA) and sent for laboratory testing within 24 hours.
At the study onset, seasonal influenza vaccine was given
routinely only to healthcare workers and selected essential
personnel in the military. When pandemic H1N1-2009 influenza
spread in Singapore, outbreaks were also noted among the military
recruits. When the monovalent pandemic vaccine (Panvax H1N1,
CSL, Australia) became available in late-2009, all new recruits
were vaccinated with this vaccine along with healthcare workers
and some other personnel which formed a minority proportion of
the non-recruit camp populations.
Written informed consent was obtained from participants, and
the study was approved by the military’s Joint Medical Committee
for Research, and by the institutional review boards of the
National University of Singapore and the Australian National
University.
Laboratory Methods
Multiplex PCR assays. For all samples, initial testing
involved extracting total nucleic acids from each specimen using
a RNA extraction kit (Qiagen, Inc, Valencia, CA, USA). Five mlo f
extract were tested with Resplex II (version 2.0, Qiagen, Inc.,
Valencia, CA, USA) for respiratory micro-organisms on the
LiquiChip 200 Workstation. Resplex II is a multiplex PCR assay
coupled with bead array detection technology and can
simultaneously detect influenza A and B viruses together with
other microbes [18–20].
Subtyping and sequencing of influenza viruses. Specimens
positive on Resplex II for influenza A virus were further subtyped
with real-time PCR for H1 or H3 [21], or for pandemic H1N1-2009
[22]. Five ml of total genetic extracts were tested with the one-step
SuperscriptIII/Platinum Taq kit (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA)
on either the LightCycler machine from Roche or the Applied
Biosystems real-time PCR machine (7500). Selected specimens were
subjected to cDNA synthesis using the uni12primer (AGCAAA-
AGCAGG) [23] with the Transcriptor First Strand cDNA synthesis
Kit (Roche Diagnostics, Mannheim, Germany). PCR amplification
of the partial H1 or H3 gene was carried out with primers described
by Ghedin et al [24]. Amplicons were sequenced using the same
primers and analysed with DNAstar, Lasergene version 7 (Madison,
USA). For specimens which were influenza B virus positive, PCR
amplification of the partial HA gene was obtained with in-house
designed primers(HA471F=59ACCTCAGGATCTTGCCCTAA-
CG-39 and HA1169R=59TGTGTATCCGTGCCAACCTGCA-
AT-39) and sequenced with the same primers. All sequences were
analysed with DNAstar, Lasergene version 7 (Madison, USA).
Statistical Analysis
Influenza data from the military surveillance were compared to
similar published data from the Singapore National Public Health
Laboratory which performs surveillance from sentinel primary
healthcare sites using ILI criteria. The data are presented on a
weekly basis to display temporal variations, while reducing the
stochasticity from daily fluctuations and day of week effects [25].
The main intervention was the pandemic H1N1-2009 vaccina-
tion program for new recruits from December 2009 onwards using
the monovalent Panvax vaccine. We compared rates of labora-
tory-confirmed influenza in Camp A with the recruit vaccination
program to the other camps (B, C and D). Using an intention-to-
treat analysis, we did not sub-analyze the small proportion of
recruits who were not vaccinated (,1%), individuals in Camps B,
C and D who had obtained pandemic H1N1 vaccination outside
this specific vaccination program in camp A (19% of the popula-
tion of Camps B, C and D), or anyone who obtained seasonal
influenza vaccine. We used two different statistical methods to
minimize possible confounding especially due to potential dif-
ferences between the camp populations.
In preliminary analyses, we assessed the relative risk of infection
by strain in the two groups of camps, Camp A versus the others, by
the two time periods, pre- and post- pandemic H1N1 vaccine. We
excluded the week during and the week immediately after new
recruits entered camp from December 2009 onwards, as vaccina-
tion was ongoing. We used a hierarchical model where the
probability of infection per week is assumed to follow a beta
distribution, with differing mean and variance for each cohort,
period and strain. This model was fitted using the Bayesian
framework, taking independent, pseudo-objective exponential
priors with mean 10,000 for the hyperparameters. Taking a beta
distribution for the weekly probabilities results in a distribution
that was more diffuse than a binomial with the same mean, and
accounts for the non-independence of infectious disease case data
in closed populations [26]. We quantified the relative risk via the
posterior distribution for the ratio of the means of the beta
distribution.
To account for potential confounders in determining the effect
of pandemic vaccination on various influenza strains, we sub-
sequently built an autoregressive statistical model to determine the
possible association between pandemic vaccination and influenza
cases developing post-vaccination. We used a generalized linear
model (Poisson with the log-link function) to determine if changes
in number of cases for each strain per week were influenced by
several key parameters including: number of cases detected by the
national surveillance program in the previous week (representing
burden of disease outside the camps), number of cases in the
camps for the previous week, entry of new recruits on the week of
arrival and the subsequent week to account for time taken for
vaccination, and a binary indicator variable encoding the recruit
camp vaccination program. We assessed for non-linear associa-
tions by using polynomial functions of covariates, and terms that
Pandemic H1N1 Vaccination Effectiveness
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dropped to obtain the model presented.
Analyses were performed using the R Statistical Software [27]
and JAGS version 2.2.0 [28].
Results
A total of 2,858 subjects with FRI consented to participate from
11 May 2009 to 25 Jun 2010. Their average age was 20.7 years old
(SD 3.2), and all but 5 (99.8%) were male. Of these cases, 15%
(437), 2.1% (60), and 9.6% (273) were pandemic H1N1-2009,
H3N2, and influenza B respectively. There were 1,885 FRI cases
from the recruit camp, Camp A, of which 15% (285) were H1N1-
2009, 2.1% (39) H3N2, 0.1% (2) seasonal H1N1 and 13% (249)
influenza B. There were 973 FRI cases from non-recruit camps,
Camps B, C and D, outside the recruit pandemic vaccination
program, of which 16% (152) were H1N1-2009, 2.2% (21) H3N2,
1% (8) seasonal H1N1, and 2.5% (24) influenza B. The few
seasonal H1N1 cases were excluded from subsequent analyses.
There were 43 cases of H1N1-2009 vaccination failure, of whom
27 (63%) had clinical onset less than a fortnight after vaccination.
Influenza Incidence and Trends
The military surveillance data are presented in Figure 1 with
national surveillance data as a comparator. A substantial propor-
tion of military cases in May 2009 tested positive for influenza A
(H3N2), corresponding to the usual epidemic month [2]. The
strain circulating in the military was the A/Perth/16/2009-
(H3N2)-like virus which was also circulating nationally.
Soon after local community transmission of pandemic H1N1-
2009 on 18 June 2009 [11], the Singapore military reported its first
outbreak on 22 June 2009 [29]. Military FRI incidence increased
substantially, peaking during the week ending 19 July 09 (about 2
weeks earlier than the general population), with a corresponding
growth in PCR-confirmed pandemic H1N1.
The circulation of pandemic H1N1 in the military declined
substantially by early October (week 40), corresponding to the end
of Singapore’s first epidemic wave. However, there were sub-
sequent sharp increases in December 2009 (weeks 48–49), January
2010 (weeks 1–2) and May 2010 (weeks 17–19). The first coincided
with the entry of new recruits into Camp A (Figure 1c), with some
transmission in the other camps (Figure 1d). This prompted
pandemic vaccination for this and subsequent batches of recruits,
since the vaccine became available in Singapore by November
2009. Apart from these three outbreaks, pandemic H1N1 inci-
dence among recruits was subsequently very low. In contrast,
pandemic H1N1 transmission in non-recruit camps occurred
throughout and peaked in May and June 2010 (Figure 1d). For the
entire study period, the circulating strain was identified as a A/
California/7/2009(H1N1)-like virus, similar to the strain in the
2010 Southern influenza vaccine.
An influenza B outbreak occurred in mid-March 2010 (weeks
11–15), especially among the recruit population; this corresponded
to a slight increase in influenza B infection in the general
population (Figure 1). The number of cases abated as recruits
completed their training, but rose in May 2010 (weeks 18–20) and
June 2010 (weeks 23–25) with the entry of new recruits. The
circulating strain was identified as being of the Victoria-lineage
and closely related to the B/Brisbane/60/2008-like virus, which
was the vaccine virus for the 2009/10 Northern and 2010
Southern influenza vaccines.
In May and June 2010, there was also an increase in proportion
of H3N2 detected in the general population and the military. The
circulating strain was the A/Perth/16/2009(H3N2)-like virus,
similar to the vaccine virus in the 2010 Southern influenza
vaccine. Seasonal influenza vaccination rates remained low in the
military (excluding healthcare workers and essential personnel).
Vaccine Effectiveness
The estimated relative risk (RR) of pandemic H1N1 infection
for Camp A personnel after the vaccination program’s start
relative to before the vaccination period was 0.056 (95% Bayesian
credible interval (BCI): 0.009, 0.16) (Table 1). The RRs in the
same period for H3N2 was 0.33 (95% BCI 0.056, 0.95), and for
influenza B were 67 (95% BCI 11, 250) respectively. For the other
camps, the RRs were 0.50 (95% BCI 0.18, 1.09), 1.2 (95% BCI
0.24, 3.8) and 8.8 (95% BCI 1.0, 39), respectively.
To compare between Camp A and the other camps, adjusting
for different rates of influenza transmission across time, the ratio of
the RR of pandemic H1N1 infection for Camp A in the post- to
the pre-vaccine periods to the RR in other camps for the same
periods (i.e. [risk after H1N1 vaccination in Camp A/risk before
vaccination in Camp A]/[risk after H1N1 vaccination in others/
risk before vaccination in others]) was 0.14 (95% BCI: 0.016,0.49)
suggesting that the vaccination program in Camp A substantially
mitigated the risk of pandemic H1N1 over and beyond the
reduction observed in other camps without vaccination programs.
The corresponding ratio of RR for H3N2 in Camp A relative to
other camps was 0.44 (95% BCI 0.035,1.8), while there was a
marked growth in the ratio for influenza B of 18 times (95% BCI
0.77,90), although for neither H3N2 nor influenza B was the ratio
of RRs statistically discernible from one.
Using the generalized linear model (GLM) for Camp A to
account for confounders, we determined that post-vaccination
with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic vaccine, the adjusted weekly
number of pandemic H1N1 cases significantly decreased by 54%
(95% confidence interval (CI): 37%, 67%, p,0.001) from what
would be expected without vaccination. Conversely, actual
influenza B cases increased by 66 times (95% CI 9 times, 479
times, p,0.001) compared to what would be expected, while no
change in H3N2 rates were statistically discernable (p=0.54).
Discussion
There is a dearth of information about influenza spread in
tropical environments, and how transmission in semi-closed
environments such as schools or military camps differs from the
general population as high attack rates have been reported [5,7].
In addition, there is little information about the effectiveness of the
pandemic vaccine in tropical regions where a large proportion of
the world’s population resides, and where early availability and
access to such vaccines may pose a challenge.
The pandemic H1N1 outbreaks in the military Camp A in
December 2009, January and May 2010, and the influenza B
outbreak in March 2010 demonstrate the unique vulnerability of
recruit populations. The physical and psychological challenges
associated with starting military life, including living in close
proximity, can result in increased influenza transmission [30]. In
addition, as new recruits enter from the general population, they
may introduce infections prevalent in the community, which are
then amplified in the closed environment as recruits are initially
confined to camp. This probably also applies to other closed and
semi-closed communities such as schools and boarding facilities.
Once the vulnerability of the new recruits was recognised and
inactivated monovalent pandemic H1N1-2009 vaccine became
available, a mass vaccination campaign with the vaccine was
introduced from December 2009 for new recruits in Camp A. Our
simple Bayesian model showed that the risk for pandemic H1N1
Pandemic H1N1 Vaccination Effectiveness
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introduction, and similarly the GLM accounting for possible
confounders showed a significant decrease of 54% over what was
expected in the absence of vaccination. Rates of pandemic H1N1
remained low despite national outbreaks.
Our study provides additional evidence of the effectiveness of
monovalent pandemic influenza vaccination. Puig et al showed a
90% vaccine effectiveness in preventing H1N1-associated hospital-
isations [31]; Simpson et al, using vaccination status among ILI
cases, showed a vaccine effectiveness of 95% [32]. Another multi-
centre case-control study in Europe found a lower 66.0% to 71.9%
vaccine effectiveness using different statistical computations [33].
Ours is the first study, to our knowledge, conducted in the tropics
among a semi-closed population that takes into account the burden
of disease both internally and externally to determine the actual
effectivenessofthevaccinebasedonlaboratoryconfirmedinfections.
Figure 1. National ILI (a) and Military FRI (b,c,d) Cases by Week, with Influenza Positivity (RT-PCR) by Strain*. *On the white panels, the
ILI or FRI cases associated with the dominant strain for the week is colored, while the rest are shaded black. On appropriate grey panels, weeks with
recruit intakes are shaded dark grey. Weekly cases of influenza-like illness (ILI, (a), white panel, from national surveillance) and febrile respiratory
illness (FRI, (b,c,d), white panels, in military camps) and % positive for influenza by RT-PCR by influenza strain (grey panels, as proportion of all ILI (a) or
FRI (b,c,d)). On the white panels, the total number of ILI or FRI cases associated with the dominant strain for each week is colored; for visual acuity,
non-dominant strains and influenza negative cases are shaded black. On appropriate grey panels, weeks with recruit intakes are shaded dark grey.
Time is measured in epidemiological weeks on each panel; an additional time axis in calendar months is presented at the foot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026572.g001
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a large rise in the risk of influenza B in Camp A compared to the
other camps, with a high ratio of RRs of 18 (though with a broad
95% BCI that spanned 1); when accounting for potential
confounders and autocorrelation via the GLM, the risk rose to
66 times that in the unvaccinated group, with enough precision to
exclude the possibility of no change. Potential reasons could be the
dominance of influenza B in the ecological niche of the vulnerable
recruits given the effective suppression of pandemic H1N1 by
vaccination. Considering that the strain of influenza B responsible
for the outbreaks in 2010 was matched to the prevailing trivalent
seasonal influenza vaccine, a universal seasonal influenza vacci-
nation program would probably have prevented this.
In addition to providing vaccines to vulnerable populations, the
timing of vaccination is important. The two pandemic H1N1
outbreaks in Camp A in January and May 2010 showed that early
outbreaks could still occur due to the lag time between vaccination
and establishment of immunity. This is substantiated by pandemic
H1N1 cases who had been vaccinated within two weeks prior to
disease onset which constituted the majority of the ‘‘vaccine
failures’’. One possible solution would be to vaccinate at-risk
groups before they congregate: for example, military recruits
before they enlist or school children before starting each school
year. This may also reduce community outbreaks, since transmis-
sion in schools may catalyse community transmission [34].
There are some limitations to this study. As influenza
transmission patterns change over time, it is inherently difficult
to compare between periods before and after vaccination from
time series data, and we relied on statistical tools to provide an
inductive estimate of the effect of vaccination. Given the non-
independent nature of infectious diseases spread, it is difficult to
assess vaccine effectiveness directly with a limited number of
cohorts, substantial levels of contact within cohorts, and the
distorting signal of the consequent herd immunity. To quantify the
uncertainty in our estimates, we used indirect methods that rely on
intrinsic replication within the time series data prospectively
collected. In addition, the populations of the camps may differ in
demographics and on prior exposure to the 2009 H1N1 virus. We
used two statistical methods to compare between the camps, and
between periods in Camp A to minimize confounding. Studies
whose purposes do not include surveillance or assessing group-
level vaccine effects might use different designs; with extrinsic
replication, either in multiple cohorts or using non-interacting
participants, allowing more direct measurements of vaccine
effectiveness at the individual level. Finally, we did not survey
milder cases without fever and asymptomatic cases, as we had to
balance completeness with a focused surveillance program. We
have however shown that vaccination reduces febrile cases and
therefore the potential impact of the program.
Pandemic 2009-H1N1 vaccine has been effective in reducing
the burden of 2009-H1N1 among recruits in the Singapore
military, and should be made available early for future pandemics.
Seasonal influenza vaccination programs for new entrants to such
communities may significantly reduce the impact of influenza
further, and should be considered routinely.
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